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Work flow policies are shown to induce a change in average between-workers variability (worker 
heterogeneity) and within-worker variability in performance times. In a laboratory experiment, the 
authors measured the levels of worker heterogeneity and within-worker variability under an individual 
performance condition, a work sharing condition, and a fixed assignment condition. The work sharing 
policy increased the levels of worker heterogeneity and worker variability, whereas the fixed assignment 
policy decreased them. These effects, along with work flow policy main effects on mean performance 
times and variability are examined. This article represents an initial step in understanding effects that may 
be important in the selection of an operating policy, the ignorance of which may lead to costly 
misestimates of performance. 
A flow line is a production line in which all work follows the 
same sequence of operations. Because of the popularity and effi­
ciency of the flow line, it has been the subject of considerable 
research (for a review, see Gagnon & Ghosh 1991; Ghosh & 
Gagnon, 1989). However, differences in worker ability and vari­
ability have been virtually ignored in operational models of flow 
lines, in spite of a wealth of psychological research evidence to 
suggest that significant differences exist, even for simple manual 
tasks (Doerr & Arreola-Risa, 2000; Hunter, Schmidt, & Judiesch, 
1990; Rothe, 1978; Schmidt, Hunter, Outerbridge, & Goff, 1988). 
Recently, however, a class of work sharing systems (WSSs) has 
been proposed (Bartholdi & Eisenstein, 1996; Zavadlav, McClain, 
& Thomas, 1996) that not only acknowledges worker differences 
but (as we explain later in this article) relies on them as well. In 
this article we examine the importance of between-workers vari­
ability (differences in the mean performance of individual work­
ers) and within-worker variability (differences in the performance 
of a single worker over time) on two kinds of flow lines. 
The issue of within-worker and between-workers variability is 
important for a variety of reasons. First, for those doing work in 
the design of flow lines, in this article we question one of the most 
common assumptions of research on this topic: that within-line 
variability is random (unbiased) noise. Typically, when investigat­
ing a design change, one assumes that the only variability of 
interest is due to the manipulation (between-line variability). Our 
results show that at least some types of design changes affect 
within-line variability as well. Second, this article represents a 
preliminary investigation into the magnitude with which flow line 
efficiency is impacted by within-worker and between-workers 
variability and the degree to which this impact is moderated by 
work flow policies. The existence of such variability, as noted 
above, is not seriously in question (though few articles have 
appeared that recognize it). It may be that the flow line design 
literature has ignored within-worker and between-workers vari­
ability because researchers believe it does not make any practical 
difference. However, this question has not been studied, and this 
article represents an initial step in the investigation of that issue. 
Finally, with our comparison of two work flow policies, this article 
contributes to improved managerial decision making by examining 
new factors (heterogeneity and variability) that appear to affect 
group performance under those policies. The potential implications 
of research into these factors could be that management should not 
attempt to select the “most efficient” policy (regardless of the 
employees) or even the “fastest” employee (regardless of the work 
flow policy) but should instead think of selecting the best policy 
for a particular group or the best worker for an existing group and 
policy. Of course, such prescriptions cannot be derived from a 
single empirical study, but our work represents an initial investi­
gation into these factors. Although it may seem overly mechanistic 
to evaluate employees in terms of their individual variability, we 
point out that such a procedure would be unquestioned if applied 
to any other input to the production (or service) process: One of the 
 
  
points of quality management is the control of variability in 
methods and materials. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that 
workers, as a major source of variability (Doerr & Arreola-Risa, 
2000), might usefully be selected and managed with some atten­
tion to variability as well. 
In the next section, we examine two work flow policies in more 
detail, to be able to hypothesize, in the Within-Worker and 
Between-Workers Variability on Flow Lines section, the different 
impact they will have on individual and group performance and 
variability. 
Work Flow Policies 
In the context of a flow line, work flow describes the way work 
moves between workers on the line. We use the term work flow 
policy (WFP) to describe all of the methods management has 
available to control work flow. These control methods all affect the 
interactions between workers. The impact of these interactions on 
the subsequent use of skills and motivational variables has been 
largely ignored in the applied psychology and operations manage­
ment literature. 
We are testing a behavioral model in this article, and our 
analysis was conducted by examining observable behaviors. How­
ever, to understand and explain our results, we draw on relevant 
literature from the field of industrial and organizational psychol­
ogy. For example, we draw on findings of motivational effects 
from studies of interdependence (Kiggundu, 1981; Thomas, 1957; 
Thompson, 1967), social loafing (Comer, 1995; Latane, Williams, 
& Harkins, 1979), social compensation (Plaks & Higgins, 2000; 
K. D. Williams & Karau, 1991), autonomy (Klein, 1989; Langfred, 
1999), feedback (Matsui, Kakuyama, & Onglatco, 1987), and 
equity (Harder, 1992) to predict and explain our results. 
We are interested in two different types of work flow policies. 
With a fixed assignment system (FAS), the workload assigned to 
each worker is a sequence of contiguous operations, fixed from 
batch to batch. (A batch is a set of tasks to perform or a set of 
products to process.) The workload is performed in a limited 
physical zone, or workstation; the workstations typically do not 
overlap, work cannot be preempted, and the coordination required 
between workers at adjacent workstations is highly constrained. Of 
course, in some cases, more than one worker may be assigned to 
a workstation, but for simplicity we assume one worker per 
workstation. 
With a WSS, the workload assignment is allowed to change 
from batch to batch (Zavadlav et al., 1996). The change of work­
load requires one worker to preempt, or interrupt, the work of 
another. An upstream worker must communicate the status of work 
on the batch to the downstream worker, and the two workers must 
coordinate the handoff of any required tooling or material needed 
to work on the batch. Thus, WSS involves a type of worker 
interaction and structural interdependence that does not exist with 
an FAS. It has been shown that such systems can, under certain 
conditions, outperform equally balanced lines and achieve a steady 
state assignment in which faster workers are more heavily loaded 
in proportion to their average individual performance (Bartholdi & 
Eisenstein, 1996). 
The FASs and WSSs can be related to the typologies of group 
tasks given by Steiner (1972). The FAS is a kind of conjunctive 
task in which the “group performance is determined by the least 
able member” (Steiner, 1972, p. 17), whereas the WSS most 
closely resembles an additive task in which the group performance 
“depends upon the sum of the individual efforts” (Steiner, 1972, p. 
17). The FAS is more complicated than the conjunctive tasks 
studied by Steiner because our tasks are variable. The WSS is more 
complicated than the additive tasks studied by Steiner because our 
tasks are variable and our assignments, or matching, is dynamic. 
Steiner (1972) claimed that for conjunctive tasks “the ideal ar­
rangement in cases of this kind is one that involves as much 
homogeneity as possible” (p. 112), whereas for additive (but not 
dynamic) tasks, he claimed that heterogeneity was “irrelevant to 
potential productivity” (p. 117). We show later in this article that 
the existence of variability complicates the first claim, whereas the 
existence of variability and dynamism makes the WSS so different 
from a typical additive task that the second claim does not apply. 
WSSs have a set of boundary rules that tell the workers, from 
batch to batch, how to interact with the upstream and downstream 
workers and where the assignments should begin and end in each 
cycle. There are different rules that can be used. In the bucket 
brigade rules most commonly used (and the ones we used in our 
experiment), workers proceed toward the end of the line with their 
current batch until they are preempted or, in the case of the last 
worker on the line, until they finish the batch. If they catch up to 
the worker ahead of them, they must wait (i.e., they are blocked). 
Once the worker at the end of the line finishes the batch he or she 
is working on, he or she walks back to the adjacent upstream 
worker, preempts that person’s work and then proceeds forward 
again with the new batch. Each worker in turn preempts the 
adjacent upstream worker except the worker at the beginning of 
the line, who begins a new batch. 
Within-Worker and Between-Workers Variability on Flow 
Lines 
In spite of the well-established existence of substantial differ­
ences between workers in performance (Doerr & Arreola-Risa, 
2000; Doerr, Mitchell, Schriesheim, Freed, & Zhou, 2002; Dudley, 
1968; Hunter et al., 1990; Knott & Sury, 1987) the FAS literature 
has typically ignored the impact of differences in worker ability. In 
1989, a comprehensive literature review of over 150 articles 
(Ghosh & Gagnon, 1989) found no research that incorporated 
worker differences in ability, possibly because the focus was on 
establishing line balances in spite of such differences so that 
workers could more easily be interchanged or replaced (Parker & 
Wall, 1998). 
In contrast, the dynamics of the workload assignment depend on 
differences in average individual performance with WSS; faster 
workers are required to do more work. Under WSS, workers 
should be ordered from slowest to fastest for maximum efficiency 
(Bartholdi & Eisenstein, 1996; Bartholdi, Eisenstein, & Foley, 
2001). Thus, WSS both assumes and depends on differences in 
average individual performance in ways that an FAS does not. 
FAS models assume that workers on a line are identical and that 
any variability is endemic to the tasks rather than to the workers 
(Doerr, Klastorin, & Magazine, 2000). WSS models, however, 
assume that workers on the line are significantly different from 
each other, but that within-worker variability is so insignificant 
that it can be ignored. 
  
Although there is a considerable body of evidence that substan­
tial differences between workers exist in terms of performance 
(Dunnette, 1983; Rothe, 1978; Schmidt & Hunter, 1983), the 
stability of these differences is still an open question. It seems that 
worker performance is dynamic: Workers’ performance relative to 
each other on a given performance criterion may change over time 
(the dynamic criterion problem; Austin & Villanova, 1992; Ploy-
hart & Hakel, 1998). Moreover, even at a given point in time, 
substantial within-worker variability in performance times has 
been shown to exist (Doerr et al., 2002; Knott & Sury, 1987). 
It can be shown that a line operating with a WSS policy should 
be more efficient (in terms of the time required to complete work) 
than a line operating with an FAS policy and balanced workloads 
(Doerr et al., 2002). However, the dominance of the WSS policy 
relies on the existence of stable (constant) worker differences in 
performance. Without stable worker differences, the performance 
of a WSS may degrade and become chaotic because upstream 
workers will become blocked by downstream workers in unpre­
dictable times and places. Although there is anecdotal evidence to 
suggest that a WSS can perform well even under certain kinds of 
variability (Bartholdi et al., 2001), to our knowledge there has been 
no systematic experimental work done to test the impact of within-
worker variability on the performance of a WSS. 
Given the sort of dynamic relative performance predicted by 
studies of the criterion problem (Austin & Villanova, 1992; Hof­
mann, Jacobs, & Baratta, 1993; Hofmann, Jacobs, & Gerras, 1992; 
Ployhart & Hakel, 1998), an ordering of workers from slowest to 
fastest is problematic over time unless the ordering is reassessed at 
regular intervals. Moreover, given substantial within-worker vari­
ability (Doerr & Arreola-Risa, 2000), the order may be established 
only for average case performance: The ordering may not hold at 
any particular point in time, because a “slow” worker may be faster 
than a “fast” worker on any particular cycle. Thus, under such 
conditions a WSS line may be less efficient than an FAS line. 
The clarity of the task assignment under a WSS is less clear, 
because the assignment changes slightly from cycle to cycle. A 
lack of clarity in task assignments is likely to lead to a lack of 
visibility and accountability for performance and encourage social 
loafing (Latane et al., 1979). This assignment clarity is also related 
to the construct of dynamic task complexity defined by Wood 
(1986), in that assignment clarity involves changes over time in the 
acts required to accomplish a task. Wood, Locke, and Mento 
(1987) argued that this construct will interact with motivation to 
influence performance. This variability in assignment may create 
an increased cognitive load that detracts attention from the work 
rate or work quality (i.e., the workers have to think more about 
which tasks to do and consequently think less about how fast or 
how well they do each task). The coordination needed to accom­
plish each cycle’s assignment is also less predictable under a WSS. 
Assignment clarity is thus an additional factor that should favor an 
FAS over a WSS. 
Mathematical models of WSS performance ignore these behav­
ioral impacts of assignment variability, and they assume constant 
worker differences and no within-worker variability (e.g., Bar­
tholdi & Eisenstein, 1996). Thus, predictions that a WSS is more 
efficient than an FAS, drawn from these models, may not be 
realized when the policy is implemented with human workers 
(Doerr et al., 2002). 
Hypothesis 1: The average group performance of WSS will 
be no better than performance of an FAS. 
In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that the theoretical dominance of 
WSSs over FASs (Doerr et al., 2002) would not be observed 
empirically. At the same time, we proposed that these policies 
themselves would change the level of within-worker and between-
workers variability observed on a flow line. We proposed that this 
change would be affected at least in part by a motivational re­
sponse to the policies that differs depending on the relative per­
formance of the individual. 
The idea that the context of a task might produce a motivational 
response is not new (Mitchell, 1997; Mowday & Sutton, 1993). 
We have already mentioned the social loafing literature, which 
suggests that some workers will shirk in contexts in which their 
performance is less directly observed. Other contexts may encour­
age workers to slow down or speed up, depending on the workers’ 
relative ability. For example, work on social compensation (Plaks 
& Higgins, 2000; K. D. Williams & Karau, 1991) suggests that 
when employees are engaged in meaningful work, faster employ­
ees will speed up if they are aware of their relative ability; the 
more important or meaningful a task, the greater the effect. 
The idea that WFPs can produce a motivational response that 
depends on the relative performance of the employees is also not 
new. The Koehler effect is the tendency for heterogeneous groups 
to perform better than would be expected from their individual 
performances (Hertel, Kerr, & Messe´, 2000). Hertel et al. (2000) 
found that the Koehler effect may occur on conjunctive tasks 
(similar to FASs) but not additive tasks (similar to WSSs). 
In the sort of serial interdependence workers on a flow line 
experience (Thompson, 1967), each worker depends on the previ­
ous, upstream worker, but in the FAS policy we examined, all 
workers depend on the slowest, or bottleneck worker to set the 
pace—no one can work faster than the bottleneck pace in the long 
run. Whereas, in the WSS policy, the fastest worker sets the pace, 
and his or her pace determines when the line resets; thus, other 
workers are dependent on the fastest worker to determine their 
assignment boundaries on each cycle. 
One of the specific motivational factors that is thought to come 
into play when one worker is depended upon by others is felt 
responsibility. Felt responsibility is a motivational force that grows 
out of expectations that one person should act to maximally 
facilitate and minimally hinder another (Thomas, 1957). To cap­
ture sources of felt responsibility, Kiggundu (1978, 1981, 1983) 
defined a variable called initiated interdependence, which mea­
sures the degree to which one employee feels that others rely upon 
him or her to accomplish their work. To the extent that initiated 
interdependence produces a sense of felt responsibility in an em­
ployee (because, for example, a downstream employee is waiting 
for him or her to pass along work), it should yield an improvement 
in performance. 
Initiated interdependence describes only one half of a dyadic 
relationship. To describe the other half, Kiggundu (1978, 1981, 
1983) defined a variable called received interdependence, which is 
felt by one employee when he or she depends upon another to 
accomplish his or her work. Kiggundu (1978, 1983) did not find 
the positive motivational impact for received interdependence that 
was found for initiated interdependence. In fact, to the extent that 
received interdependence is associated with reduced autonomy, it 
  
is likely to have a generally negative motivational impact (Klein, 
1989). Depending on their relative performance and the WFP in 
place, employees on a flow line may experience either primarily 
initiated or primarily received interdependence. 
Prior to our experiment, we believed the following would be 
true: On the static FAS line, the faster employees will experience 
the most interruption of work by a peer, through the blocking 
(waiting to pass work or move downstream) and starving (waiting 
for work from upstream) caused by adjacent employees. Con­
versely, on a dynamic WSS line, slower employees will experience 
the most interruptions relative to the amount of work accom­
plished. Thus, the fastest employee on the static FAS line and the 
slowest one on a WSS line are most likely to experience negative 
motivational states because of the control of their work pace by 
another employee. Because this is likely to be perceived as a loss 
of autonomy, it should be detrimental to performance (Klein, 
1989; Langfred, 1999). 
In comparison, the slowest employee on a static line will expe­
rience the most responsibility for others because he or she is the 
most frequent cause of starving or blocking another employee. 
This experience will be shared by the fastest employee on a WSS 
line because he or she controls the end of every cycle, and the 
whole line resets according to his or her pace. Consequently, these 
employees will be most likely to experience positive motivation 
because they have to provide work to others and maintain the work 
flow. Because this is likely to be perceived as increased pressure 
to perform, the effect will be a positive motivational impact 
(Kiggundu, 1983; Stewart & Barrick, 2000; Wong & Campion, 
1991). 
In particular, because the slowest worker on an FAS line will be 
the bottleneck, he or she should experience something like initiated 
interdependence and feel the greatest amount of pressure to in­
crease his or her work rate. Schultz, Juran, and Boudreau (1998) 
observed that bottleneck workers increased their work rate when 
interstation buffers were reduced (thus increasing the likelihood 
that they would cause starvation and blocking of adjacent work­
ers). However, the slowest worker is not a bottleneck on the WSS 
line; this worker should experience something like received inter­
dependence. His or her work will merely be preempted by an 
adjacent worker as needed to keep that worker busy. Moreover, the 
constant preemption may be perceived as negative feedback by the 
slowest worker, who will not experience any autonomy or control 
over the work pace of the group. 
Hypothesis 2A: The slowest worker will perform more 
quickly on an FAS line than on a WSS line. 
Because the fastest worker on the FAS line will experience the 
most idle time due to starvation and blocking, he or she is likely to 
experience less autonomy and control over work methods. Because 
his or her pace will be determined by the slowest worker, he or she 
should experience something like received interdependence. The 
attention of the fastest worker may be distracted more frequently 
because of increased idle time. Attention, and especially the focus 
and direction of attention, is considered to be a primary motiva­
tional process and has been shown to be related to the amount of 
effort exerted on a task (Mitchell, 1997). Thus, the fastest worker 
may be expected to slow down on an FAS. However, the fastest 
worker has much more autonomy and control on a WSS line. His 
or her work will never be preempted by an adjacent worker, and he 
or she will never be blocked or starved. The fact that other workers 
depend on the fastest worker to set their pace should cause them to 
experience something like initiated interdependence. The potential 
to control and maintain a steady work pace is likely to be a positive 
motivational force. 
Hypothesis 2B: The fastest worker on a flow line will perform 
faster on a WSS than on an FAS. 
Hypotheses 1, 2A, and 2B deal with mean performance. Hy­
pothesis 1 postulates an observable effect in relative mean line 
performance between WFPs based on considerations of within-
worker and between-workers variability and assignment clarity. 
Hypotheses 2A and 2B postulate that work flow policies will 
induce an observable effect in mean individual performance, de­
pending on the relative abilities of the employees. 
Hypotheses 2A and 2B also imply something about the level of 
between-workers differences, or heterogeneity, one would expect 
to see on a line. Under an FAS, Hypotheses 2A and 2B predict that 
faster workers will slow down, whereas slower workers will speed 
up: a regression to the mean or a decrease in heterogeneity of 
performances. Under WSS, Hypotheses 2A and 2B predict that 
faster workers will speed up and slower workers will become even 
slower: an increase in heterogeneity. Thus, Hypothesis 2C is 
corollary to Hypotheses 2A and 2B. 
Hypothesis 2C: Between-workers variability in performance 
will be greater under a WSS than under an FAS. 
Thus, Hypotheses 1 and 2 (A, B, and C) predict a multiphase 
relationship in which preexisting differences in worker ability and 
variability produce differences in the relative effectiveness of work 
flow polices, and work flow policies act to moderate this effect by 
reducing heterogeneity in FAS lines but increasing it on WSS 
lines. 
We next turn to an examination of within-worker variability. 
The existence of substantial and systematic within-worker vari­
ability over time is well documented (Deadrick & Madigan, 1990; 
Hofmann et al., 1992; Rothe, 1978). Moreover, individuals appear 
to have systematic differences in within-worker variability that can 
be predicted in field settings (Deadrick & Gardner, 1997; Hofmann 
et al., 1993; Ployhart & Hakel, 1998). This within-worker vari­
ability has been measured not only in longitudinal studies of shifts 
of mean performance but also in examinations of systematic dif­
ferences between workers in within-worker work-rate distributions 
over short time frames, for example, during the course of an 
experiment (Doerr & Arreola-Risa, 2000; Knott & Sury, 1987). 
Thus individual variability is important not only because it exists 
but rather because it is both systematic and different across 
individuals. 
Although variability is recognized as an important topic in the 
design of production flow lines, within-worker variability has been 
virtually ignored in the operations management literature. The 
source of variability in task times is almost always assumed, at 
least implicitly, to be the tasks themselves and not the workers 
(Doerr & Arreola-Risa, 2000). Thus, models that deal with vari­
ability in the design of production flow lines (e.g., Bartholdi et al., 
2001; Carraway, 1989) cannot be used to address questions about 
  
the impact that differences between workers in within-worker 
variability have on flow line performance, because they implicitly 
assume that workers are interchangeable and that particular work­
ers do not affect the variability that (in those models) is inherent in 
the tasks themselves. 
We proposed that within-worker variability will be affected by 
work flow policies, because different policies will produce more or 
less clarity and simplicity in the work flow. In discussing Hypoth­
esis 1, we noted the ways that variability in work assignment may 
reduce group performance in WSS. Here, we note that variability 
in work assignment may also induce variability in individual 
performance. 
Moreover, compared with an FAS, WSS involves more coordi­
nation between workers because they must preempt one another 
and communicate about the status of the work that they are passing 
along. WSS also potentially involves a greater range of activities 
and more physical movement along the line than an FAS. These 
factors will combine to affect the variability of individual work 
times because (apart from any difference in mean performance 
due, e.g., to the coordination, preemption, and movement time) 
they will create intermittent distractions in the work flow and 
require a dispersion of effort and attention. Hence, 
Hypothesis 3: Within-worker variability will be greater on a 
WSS line than on an FAS line. 
In Hypothesis 2C we predicted changes in between-workers 
variability in performance across different policies. In Hypothesis 
3 we predicted changes in within-worker variability in perfor­
mance across different policies. In the next section, we describe an 
experiment conducted to investigate these three hypotheses. 
Method 
Participants consisted of 105 undergraduate students enrolled in an 
introductory operations management class at a private university in the 
southeastern United States. Participation in this experiment could be used 
to partly satisfy a research requirement for the course, but other activities 
could satisfy that requirement as well. No coercion was applied to garner 
student participation, and the investigators did not recruit from their own 
classes. Participation from classes in which students were recruited aver­
aged 84%. Neither the age, gender, nor ethnicity of the participants was 
tracked, but participants were diverse in gender and ethnicity and repre­
sented a cross-section of the undergraduate population and were not 
noticeably different from the general student population. 
The experiment consisted of a behavioral simulation of an order-picking 
operation. Totes (approximately 10 in. [25.4 cm] X 6 in. [15.24 cm] X 0.5 
in. [1.27 cm]) of Halloween toys were arranged in five racks, with 9 totes 
to a rack (see Figure 1). Totes were placed three to a column on a table so 
that once a participant was standing in front of a column of 3 totes, every 
tote in the column was within easy arms reach for every participant. A rack 
thus consisted of three contiguous columns of 3 totes each. The face of 
each rack was 30 in. (76.20 cm) across. The first and fifth racks were 
separated from the second and fourth racks, respectively, by a distance of 
20 in. (50.80 cm), whereas the second, third, and fourth racks were 
separated from each other by a distance of 10 in. (25.40 cm). Therefore, the 
total length of the line was 210 in. (533.40 cm) and an even division into 
three stations would have five columns (15 totes) distributed across 70 in. 
(177.80 cm). 
Manipulations consisted of an individual-work condition (IWC), an FAS 
condition, and a WSS condition. During every condition, one investigator 
stood on the left side of the racks (the beginning of the line) and gave 
Figure 1. The order-picking racks. 
participants an order form and a bag to be filled according to the order 
form. A second investigator stood on the right side of the racks and 
collected the order form and filled bag. A third investigator stood across a 
table from the second, and participants were told that this investigator was 
in charge of quality control and would be verifying their work. Participants 
were told to work as quickly as possible without making errors. During the 
experiment, participants filled a total (across all conditions) of 90 customer 
orders (30 in each condition), with each order consisting of requests for 
various items from each of the totes. The orders were balanced so that the 
same number of requests came from each column of 3 totes. 
During the IWC, there were 10 trials in which participants were given a 
bag and a customer order listing 15 items to be placed in the bag. The items 
on the customer orders were printed according to their physical sequence 
on the line so that a participant could start filling the bag at one end of the 
line and proceed down the line to the end filling the bag along the way. 
When the participant reached the end of the line, he or she gave the filled 
bag to a second investigator and returned to the beginning of the line. To 
avoid a confound with learning effects, we used only the average times 
from the last three bags to compute individual work rates and variability. 
Although significant learning seemed to take place as the initial two to 
three bags were filled, a paired t test comparing the mean time each 
participant required to fill each of the last three bags (M = 42.37 s, a = 
5.54) with the mean time that same participant required to fill the previous 
bag (M = 42.86 s, a = 6.48) revealed no significant difference, t(104) = 
1.12, p > .05, indicating that any remaining learning was insignificant 
when participants filled the last three bags. 
For the FAS and WSS conditions, participants were grouped randomly 
into teams of 3, and those teams were used for both conditions. In both 
conditions, participants were assigned to positions on the line in ascending 
order of the work rates calculated from the individual condition so that the 
slowest participant was at the beginning of the line and the fastest partic­
ipant was at the end of the line. These relative work rates, assessed during 
the experiment with stopwatch observations, were later verified by the use 
of videotape observations. In no case was an inappropriate assignment 
made (e.g., in no case was a participant who performed more slowly during 
the individual condition inadvertently “promoted” to an advanced position 
on the line). Thirty orders were filled in both conditions, but only obser­
vations from 24 orders (5–28) were used to compute individual and group 
work rates. (The first 4 orders were discarded to control for possible 
learning effects, and the last 2 orders were discarded because the partici­
pants may have become aware that the condition was ending and thus 
worked at a different pace.) To test for order effects between the FAS and 
WSS conditions, we designed the experiment so that half of the participants 
went from an individual work to an FAS condition and then to a WSS 
condition, whereas the rest went from an IWC to a WSS condition and then 
an FAS condition. All dependent variables were tested for significant order 
effects using paired t tests, but no significant order effects were found, so 
we collapsed the cells for analysis. 
During the FAS condition, participants were assigned columns of totes 
so that each participant had five columns of totes to pick from, distributed 
across an equal physical space of 70 in. (177.80 cm; see Figure 1). A 
customer order would be given to the first participant, who would pick five 
items and then hand the order along with the partially filled bag to the next 
participant. (For the first orders, the last 2 participants were given partially 
filled bags and told to continue the order as if the upstream worker had just 
handed the order to them.) Participants were not allowed to build intersta­
tion buffers but instead had to (a) wait (become blocked) if the downstream 
participant was not ready to receive an order and (b) wait (become starved) 
if an upstream participant was not ready to pass an order down. 
During the WSS condition, 3 participants were again assigned to the line 
to fill customer orders. Participants were again arranged from slowest to 
fastest on the line. This time, however, participants followed the bucket 
brigade rules (outlined above) to fill the orders. Starting positions for the 
first orders were determined by computing the number of columns each 
participant should cover on average at a steady state, ni, then positioning 
the participants from slowest to fastest so that ni columns were between 
them. The number of columns was determined as follows: 
 1
ni   15 1 i  
 i  
i
where  i is the velocity of the ith participant and [a] is the nearest integer 
to a. This procedure places participants in the starting position that is the 
closest to the steady state starting positions they would gravitate toward 
over a long period of time (Bartholdi & Eisenstein, 1996). These steady-
state starting positions should be optimal, in the sense that they eliminate 
starving and blocking in a system without within-worker variability (Doerr 
et al., 2002). Proponents of a WSS would prescribe this as an initial starting 
position if it could be implemented in advance, because it would reduce the 
amount of inefficiency (relative to some other starting position) incurred in 
the transition state. In other words, we were starting the workers where 
they were supposed to wind up starting after a large number of cycles. 
Starting them at that point reduces potential inefficiencies that may occur 
in getting from an arbitrary starting point to this prescribed starting point. 
Thus, this prescribed point should be the starting position that most favors 
the WSS system. Because one of the points of our article is to question the 
efficiency of the WSS system, this is a conservative procedure. 
Measures 
Data were collected on videotape by placing a camera approximately 20 
ft (about 6.09 m) in front of the simulated pick area. The camera was 
started before the first experimental condition began and allowed to run 
throughout data collection. We coded data coded from the videotape by 
using a stopwatch to measure performance times. Although these stop­
watch measures of performance were subject to some potential coding 
error, test–retest reliability (r = .90) was deemed acceptable. 
Group performance was measured by observing the time required for an 
order to travel from the beginning to the end of the line (flow time). Note 
that the group performance measure includes idle time due to starvation 
and blocking, but the individual performance measure does not. For the 
IWC, group performance was defined as the average flow time of the 3 
participants in the group used for the WSS and FAS conditions. Group 
heterogeneity was measured by taking the standard deviation of the mean 
individual performance times for the group. 
Individual performance was measured by observing the time an individ­
ual required to fill his or her portion of an order from the moment he or she 
received the order and bag (either from the investigator at the beginning of 
the line or from an upstream participant) until the moment the participant 
was ready to release the order and bag (either to the investigator at the end 
of the line or to a downstream participant). The performance time was 
converted to a time per pick by dividing the time used by the number of 
picks (15 in the individual condition, 5 in the FAS condition, and a variable 
number in the WSS condition). Thus, individual performance does not 
include idle time due to starvation, blocking, or coordination, nor is it 
directly impacted by the fact that a varying number of picks might be 
required under different policies. 
Because we did not collect measures of ability apart from individual 
performance in the IWC, we wanted to further assess the reliability of this 
measure. Although it is one of the points of our hypotheses that individual 
performance will be affected by work flow policy, we also expected to see 
some stability in this measure across policies. To test this, we correlated 
individual performance means across policies. The correlation between 
individual performance means in the IWC and FAS individual performance 
means was moderate but significant (r = .68, p < .01). Likewise, the 
correlation between individual performance means in the IWC and WSS 
individual performance means was moderate but significant (r = .54, p < 
.01). Although not large, the difference between these two correlations was 
significant (Fisher’s z = 2.27, p = .01) 
A couple of observations are worth making about these correlation 
results. First, they establish the point that there is some stability in our 
individual performance measure but that individual performance is also 
determined by work flow policy. If one considers individual performance 
in the individual work condition as a surrogate for an ability measure, these 
correlations can also be seen as an estimate of the predictability of indi­
vidual performance under a WSS or an FAS policy, from ability measures. 
Second, because one of the justifications of the WSS policy is that it 
should allow workers to proceed at their own pace, it is somewhat coun­
terintuitive that FAS individual performance means would correlate more 
strongly with individual performance means under the IWC. As explored 
further below, we believe this is mostly caused by a line position effect in 
the WSS policy. To check this, we recalculated the correlations controlling 
for line position effects, and the difference between the two policies 
disappeared (the IWC–FAS correlation dropped to .67 and the IWC–WSS 
correlation rose to .62). Thus, it appears that under both policies, individual 
performance is somewhat predictable from individual performance under 
the IWC, but the WSS policy has a line position effect that attenuates the 
relationship. 
Finally, within-worker variability was measured with a coefficient of 
variation (CV) for each participant. This was computed by dividing the 
standard deviation of individual performance times by the mean individual 
performance time. 
One might argue that faster workers would tend to be less variable ones 
and hence cause correlation between our two individual performance 
measures. The existence of such correlation would not be especially 
problematic, because we have no hypotheses that relate these two perfor­
mance measures (i.e., we have no hypotheses about the relationship be­
tween heterogeneity and variability); however, this correlation is worth 
examining, both because it deals with the divergent validity of our indi­
vidual performance measures and because the relationship is interesting in 
its own right. To test this, we correlated individual performance means 
with individual performance standard deviations under each of the three 
policies. As expected, faster workers were somewhat less variable under 
the IWC (r = .43, p < .00). Controlling for line position, this relationship 
is even stronger under the WSS (r = .65, p < .00) but weaker under the 
FAS policy (r = .22, p = .02), and the difference was significant (Fisher’s 
z = 5.57, p < .01). This is not surprising, because (as we show below) the 
 WSS policy induces variability in slower workers, whereas the FAS policy 
induces variability in faster workers. The size of the difference in corre­
lation between the FAS and WSS policy is somewhat surprising, however. 
Analyses 
To test for differences in group performance and heterogeneity by 
condition, we used a paired t test to compare the WSS and FAS conditions. 
We also conducted a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test for 
differences among the WSS condition, FAS condition, and IWC, with a 
Sheffe´ test to make post hoc pairwise comparisons between the three 
conditions. Note that our test of Hypothesis 1 requires that we accept that 
there is no difference between the means—that is, we need to accept the 
null hypothesis. The problems with doing this with the tools of traditional 
hypothesis testing are well known (Harcum, 1990; Malgady, 1998; Weitz­
man, 1984 ), and we will not add to this debate. Rather, we present our 
results, including an effect size and overlap (Cohen, 1988) and claim 
support for our hypothesis to the extent that the effect size is trivial and the 
distributions overlap. 
To test for the interactive effects of line position and policy condition on 
individual performance times and variability, we used a general linear 
model (GLM; Cohen & Cohen, 1984). To test for differences between 
individual line positions and policies, we used a cell means test (Toothaker, 
1993). This procedure involves a t test for significant difference between 
specific cell means of interest and is more informative than a simple test for 
interaction or a Sheffe´ test for differences within levels of a single factor. 
Critical values for the t tests were derived using a procedure developed by 
Cicchetti (1972). 
Results 
Results for group performance are shown in Table 1. As can be 
seen there, the flow times for the two policies are almost identical. 
A one-tailed t test, paired t(34) = .68, p = .50, shows a small, 
nonsignificant difference (effect size d = .13) and a large degree 
of overlap (U = .098, indicating that the two distributions overlap 
by over 90%; Cohen, 1988). This provides support for Hypothesis 
1. The lack of a practical or significant difference is surprising in 
light of the normative models that predict that the WSS will be 
more efficient than the FAS (Doerr et al., 2002). We also con­
ducted an ANOVA to test for differences among all three work 
conditions and found that the work flow policies did not improve 
flow time above the average flow time observed for the members 
of the group under the individual work condition, F(2, 102) = 
.348, p = .707, 12 = .063 (Sheffe´ tests also indicated that there 
were no significant differences between any pair of the three 
policies.) 
Results for individual performance are shown in Table 2. A 
GLM F(8, 306) = 20.356, p < .00, 12 = .418, indicated signif­
icant policy effects, F(2, 306) = 23.762, p < .00, 12 = .280, 
Table 1 
Flow Time 
Policy M  SD  
WSS 
FAS 
IND 
44.09 
44.86 
44.26 
4.81 
6.58 
5.31 
Note. Means and standard deviations are shown in seconds per order. 
Each policy group contained 35 participants. WSS = work sharing system; 
FAS = fixed assignment system; IND = individual work. 
Table 2 
Individual Task Times 
Line position 
Beginning Middle End 
Policy M  SD  M  SD  M  SD  
WSS 3.31 0.55 3.52 0.71 2.71 0.38 
FAS 2.91 0.38 2.83 0.41 2.57 0.32 
IND 3.27 0.40 2.89 0.35 2.61 0.29 
Note. Means and standard deviations are shown in seconds per pick. Each 
policy group contained 105 participants. WSS = work sharing system; 
FAS = fixed assignment system; IND = individual work. 
significant line position effects, F(2, 306) = 44.917, p < .00, 12 = 
.348, and a significant interaction, F(4, 306) = 6.372, p < .00, 
12 = .221. As can be seen in Table 2, the slowest worker (at the 
beginning of the line) was faster under an FAS than under a WSS, 
and a cell means test indicated that the difference was significant 
at = .05, t(3, 60) = 3.809 > 2.404. This provides strong support 
for Hypothesis 2A. However, contrary to Hypothesis 2B, the faster 
worker (at the end of the line) was also faster under an FAS policy. 
Thus, Hypothesis 2B received no support. In fact, all workers were 
faster under the FAS policy. This may seem surprising given the 
results of the analysis of Hypothesis 1, but the explanation is quite 
simple: The WSS policy, as expected, reduced idle time associated 
with starvation and blocking. That is, the workers on the FAS line, 
while actually filling orders, were faster than the workers on the 
WSS line, but the groups’ overall performance was no better 
because of the idle time on the FAS. 
Results for group heterogeneity are shown in Table 3. Compared 
with the individual condition, worker performance was more ho­
mogenous under an FAS and more heterogeneous under a WSS. 
An ANOVA indicated that the differences among the three poli­
cies were significant, F(2, 102) = 14.460, p < .00, 12 = .344, and 
a Sheffe´ test indicated that performance under the WSS policy was 
significantly more heterogeneous than performance under the FAS 
policy, t = 5.275, p < .00. Thus Hypothesis 2C received strong 
support. 
Results for individual variability are shown in Table 4. Within-
subject variability was higher under a WSS than under an FAS. It 
is interesting to note that the average CV under the individual 
policy (0.187) was higher than the average CV under an FAS 
(0.140) but lower than the average CV under WSS (0.296). A 
GLM, F(8, 306) = 15.667, p < .00, 12 = .388) indicated that the 
differences between policies were significant, F(2, 306) = 44.60, 
p < .00, 12 = .349, and a Sheffe´ test showed that the pairwise 
Table 3 
Standard Deviation of Each Group’s Average Seconds per Pick 
Policy SD 
WSS 0.552 
FAS 0.257 
IND 0.352 
Note. Each policy group contained 35 participants. WSS = work sharing 
system; FAS = fixed assignment system; IND = individual work. 
Table 4 
Coefficients of Variation 
Line position 
Policy Beginning Middle End 
WSS 
FAS 
IND 
0.260 
0.129 
0.196 
0.396 
0.152 
0.190 
0.231 
0.138 
0.175 
Note. Coefficients of variation are shown in seconds per pick. Each 
policy group contained 35 participants. WSS = work sharing system; 
FAS = fixed assignment system; IND = individual work. 
difference between the WSS and the FAS policies was also sig­
nificant, t = 9.21, p < .00. These results provide limited support 
for Hypothesis 3. However, the GLM also showed that there was 
a significant main effect for line position, F(2, 306) = 7.896, p < 
.00, 12 = .184, and a significant interaction between line position 
and policy, F(4, 306) = 5.070, p < .00, 12 = .203. This significant 
interaction makes a simple interpretation of the main effect of 
work flow policy problematic, because it suggests that the rela­
tionship is not as straightforward as suggested by Hypothesis 3. 
Starting with the slowest worker, the CVs observed in the indi­
vidual work condition were .196, .190, and .175. Thus, whereas 
there is a slight tendency for faster workers to also be less variable, 
the difference between participants was small. As already noted, 
the CVs observed for the line positions under the FAS policy were 
somewhat smaller (0.129, 0.152, and 0.138), but the middle-of­
the-line position now shows the most variability, whereas the 
beginning-of-the-line position shows the least. Under the WSS 
policy, the CVs were all larger than those observed under the other 
two conditions (0.260, 0.396, and 0.233), but the end-of-the-line 
position exhibited the least variability. Thus, although it appears 
that the WSS policy does induce variability in individual work 
rates, the effect is much stronger for the middle-of-the-line posi­
tion. Conversely, whereas it appears that the FAS policy reduces 
variability in individual work rates, the effect is somewhat weaker 
for the middle-of-the-line position. 
Discussion 
The primary implication of the analysis supporting Hypothesis 1 
is that the relative efficacy of a WFP is significantly affected by 
behavioral factors. Theoretical and mathematical models show that 
WSS policy should dominate an FAS policy. However, these 
models assume stationary work rates from individuals that are 
unaffected by the WFP and continuous work flow unaffected by 
the need to coordinate the boundaries of work assignments. Our 
findings did not show that the WSS policy dominates the FAS 
policy, but the findings should not be interpreted as showing that 
the two are identical and certainly not that the FAS is better. Still, 
the failure to find the dominance predicted by the mathematical 
models is itself interesting as a counterexample to those models, 
and it demonstrates the need to include worker effects in models of 
WFP performance. 
The result that the two policies may not be significantly differ­
ent is practically important for at least two reasons. First, compa­
nies spend money to implement WSSs because they think it will 
improve productivity. Our findings suggest that this expense may 
be inappropriate. Second, WSSs will evidently increase between-
workers differences in performance. The result of this will be 
either to increase differences in pay (if individual performance is 
a significant component of pay) or to increase inequity (if indi­
vidual performance is not a significant component of pay). Either 
outcome is likely to have negative consequences (Cobb & Frey, 
1996; Harder 1992; S. Williams, 1999). 
The primary implication of the results supporting Hypothesis 
2A is that line position effects are also significant determinants of 
individual and group work rates and that these effects are also 
dependent on the type of WFP in place. Although these line 
position effects are similar to the effects first investigated analyt­
ically by Hillier and Boling (1966), ours is the first article we know 
of that shows line position effects on individual performance. 
Contrary to Hypothesis 2, we found that the effect of the WSS 
policy was not to increase the speed of the fastest worker and 
decrease the speed of the slowest but rather to decrease every 
worker’s speed, most notably the middle worker. There are at least 
four potential explanations for the policy main effect that individ­
ual performance is decreased under a WSS but increased under an 
FAS. The first is an effect due to assignment clarity. The increased 
cognitive load associated with maintaining a dynamic boundary 
may reduce individual performance for all workers on the WSS 
line. Another explanation is rooted in the way that feedback on 
relative performance is received by the workers under the two 
policies. Feedback is generally motivational, and feedback on 
relative performance may be especially so (Matsui et al. 1987). 
Under the FAS it is obvious on every cycle who is fastest, because 
that person finishes before the adjacent worker and has to wait. 
This feedback is likely to create a motivational force that is not felt 
under the WSS, in which feedback on the relative speed is not as 
clear from cycle to cycle. Related to this is a social loafing (Latane 
et al., 1979) explanation: Workers under a WSS are slower be­
cause their individual contributions are less obvious. Still another 
possibility has to do with the perceived equity of the system. The 
rewards for participation were the same for all participants: satis­
fying a course requirement. But it may have become clear to the 
participants that faster work on the WSS line would translate into 
a heavier workload. Such perceived inequity is likely to be demo­
tivational (Harder, 1992). 
A possible explanation for the significant decrease in the per­
formance of the middle worker under the WSS may be that the 
boundaries between workers exert a greater cognitive load under 
the WSS. For the workers at the beginning and end of a WSS line, 
there is only one boundary point between workers. However, for 
the worker in the middle, there are two boundary points in every 
cycle, the locations of which are beyond his or her control. 
The analysis supporting the corollary Hypothesis 2C shows the 
impact these line position effects can have on group heterogeneity. 
Whereas the effects on the heterogeneity of work rates on the WSS 
and FAS lines were opposite (WSS increased heterogeneity, al­
though FAS decreased it), the net effect on mean group perfor­
mance is unclear. Whereas an increase in heterogeneity should be 
associated with less blocking on a WSS (because a slower worker 
is less likely to catch up to a faster worker when the difference 
between them is greater), and a decrease in heterogeneity should 
be associated with less starvation on an FAS (because a faster 
workers will wait less time for a slower worker when the differ­
ence between them is less), our analysis of flow times (see Table 
1) did not demonstrate any significant reduction in flow time 
compared with the individual work policy. Further work is needed 
to examine the significance of any reduction in starvation and 
blocking due to the effect of WFP on heterogeneity and whether 
that reduction is more significant for one policy than for another. 
The analysis supporting Hypothesis 3 that demonstrates that 
WFPs have an impact on the variability of individual work rates is 
significant for researchers who study flow lines, because it sug­
gests that within-cell variance cannot be ignored when making 
between-cell comparisons of WFP performance. Although it was 
not hypothesized, our data also showed that the middle-of-the-line 
positions tend to exhibit more variability than the other line posi­
tions under the WSS, perhaps because of the dispersion of atten­
tion required to monitor both upstream and downstream assign­
ment boundaries. Although some research has examined the 
allocation of given levels of individual variability to different line 
positions as a part of a WFP (e.g., Lau, 1992), to our knowledge, 
our research is the first to suggest that line position itself changes 
the magnitude of that variability. 
The managerial implication of these changes in variability will 
likely depend on the magnitude of the underlying variability. There 
exist industrial settings in which CVs are considerably larger than 
those found in this laboratory study (Doerr & Arreola-Risa, 2000; 
Knott & Sury, 1987). The magnitude of the increase in individual 
variability associated with the WSS policy on this data set (a 
33%–108% increase in CV, depending on the line position) sug­
gests that further investigation should be undertaken to determine 
a threshold level of variability at which the statistically significant 
individual level effects described in this analysis begin to make a 
practical difference in group performance. 
In spite of the dearth of operations management models incor­
porating within-worker and between-workers variability, firms 
seem to be aware of it. Automation, between-workers buffer 
inventories, and methods training can all be seen, in part, as 
(expensive) ways to ameliorate the “problem” of within-worker 
and between-workers variability, whereas a WSS can be seen as an 
attempt to exploit between-workers variability rather than to avoid 
it. Our results suggest that WSS may not be able to successfully 
exploit between-workers differences, because the policy itself in­
duces within-worker variability. 
Limitations, Extensions, and Summary 
This article has examined within-worker and between-workers 
differences in performance, factors typically ignored in operations 
management models of production lines. There are at least three 
reasons why this examination is significant. First, the existence of 
within-worker variability that is affected by work flow policy 
suggests that statistical analysis of work flow policy interventions 
must account for within-cell variability. Second, we have shown 
that the effect of within-worker and between-workers variability 
on flow line efficiency is moderated by work flow policies. Al­
though the existence of such variability was not seriously in 
question, few articles have appeared that recognize it, and very 
little empirical work demonstrates it. Third, this article represents 
an initial step in the investigation of the issue of the practical 
significance of the effect of within-worker and between-workers 
variability and demonstrates that the significance of the effect may 
depend on the work flow policy. Although we believe that the 
contribution of this article in each of these three areas is signifi­
cant, the article has a number of limitations and needs to be 
extended in a number of ways. 
A primary limitation is the difficultly in generalizing from 
student subjects. However, it is important to note that this limita­
tion applies equally to both the WSS and the FAS systems we 
examined. Thus, because our main goal was to compare these two 
systems, we see no reason why the use of student subjects should 
have biased this comparison. In other words, we fully recognize 
that the motivation and behavior of full-time workers employed in 
production jobs will not be the same as that of students engaged in 
a behavioral simulation (however elaborate the simulation). How­
ever, this limitation does not directly impact the generalizability of 
our results, because our results deal with differences between the 
impact of two operating policies on motivation and performance. 
Although it may also be true that the differences between the 
impact of the policies would not be the same for students as for 
workers employed in production jobs, we see no strong argument 
as to why this should be so (or how it would bias the results). 
Nonetheless, it is clear that laboratory research of the type reported 
in this article needs to be cross-validated in the field, on different 
sorts of tasks, with longer flow lines, and with other workflow 
policies. We point to the need for such cross-validation as an 
obvious extension of the current work. 
In this article, we have compared balanced (equal workload) 
FAS lines with WSS lines that naturally unbalance the workload so 
that faster workers receive more work. This is appropriate because, 
as we noted, the FAS literature has typically ignored worker 
differences in ability in the past. However, differences in average 
individual performance have recently been addressed in the FAS 
literature. Additional line-balancing algorithms have appeared that 
account for differences in average individual performance and 
variability (Doerr et al., 2000). These algorithms load faster work­
ers more heavily than slower workers, in proportion to their 
average performance and variability. Such “imbalanced” lines 
outperform balanced lines when worker differences exist (Doerr et 
al. 2000). Clearly a comparison between WSS lines and these 
“imbalanced” FAS lines is another obvious extension of the 
present work. 
We also reported line position effects, but because we did not 
manipulate line position by assigning one participant to multiple 
positions or by randomly assigning positions (so that relative speed 
and position interactions could be checked), our ability to make 
statements about these effects is limited. Moreover, we examined 
only three position lines, which limits our ability to make state­
ments, for example, about generalized middle-position effects. We 
did not manipulate line position, because we were trying to avoid 
a confound with sequence and policy effects—as slow to fast is the 
prescribed sequence for WSS, our manipulation provides a clear 
comparison on that basis and allows us to examine only dynamic 
versus static work assignments. We feel that this was appropriate, 
because the focus of our study was not line position effects. 
However, interactions between line position and relative speed 
need to be examined in future work. 
Whereas this article reports on observable behaviors (perfor­
mance times), the underlying logic supporting the effects we 
observed rests, in part, on psychological variables that we did not 
measure (e.g., interdependence, assignment clarity variables). 
Thus, although many of our hypotheses were supported, and those 
hypotheses are consonant with the psychological explanations we 
have discussed, it remains a limitation of this article that some 
underlying psychological mechanisms have not been directly in­
vestigated. In part, this is due to the lack of an appropriate 
measurement scale. Although scales have been developed for 
received and initiated interdependence (Kiggundu, 1978, 1981, 
1983), and modifications of those scales have been used success­
fully in some research (e.g., Stewart & Barrick, 2000), the scales 
may not be appropriate for studies of sequential interdependence 
or in lab settings. Scale development is also needed for assignment 
clarity, which to our knowledge is a new construct, and for 
received and initiated interdependence. Such scale development is 
a clear direction for future work. 
Although our article draws on some of the individual-difference 
literature for theoretical support (e.g., Ployhart & Hakel, 1998; 
Schmidt & Hunter, 1983), we did not measure any individual-
difference psychological constructs (e.g., preference for group 
work; Shaw, Duffy, & Stark, 2000), nor did we measure differ­
ences in cognitive ability or attempt to correlate our individual 
work condition performance measure with any other individual-
difference variable. We believe that the relationship between in­
dividual performance and measures of, for example, individual 
differences in cognitive ability are beyond the scope of the current 
article, in which we attempt to assess the interaction between 
individual performance and work flow policy on group perfor­
mance. However, more investigation is clearly needed into the 
relationship between individual-difference variables and the fac­
tors examined in this article. 
In addition, we held constant obvious external factors, such as 
pay, that may differ between policies and have motivational im­
plications. Future work is needed to embed the phenomenon we 
study in a broader social–psychological context. In doing this, it is 
important to note that a cross-level structural model is needed. In 
the current research, some of the variables were measured at the 
individual level (individual performance and variability) and some 
at the group level (group performance and heterogeneity). Like­
wise, some of the psychologically related variables will need to be 
measured at the group level (e.g., cohesion, the Koehler effect) and 
some at the individual level (e.g., social compensation, assignment 
clarity, social loafing, and motivation), whereas some should be 
measured at multiple levels (e.g., equity and interdependence). 
It is difficult to draw managerial implications from a single 
experiment, and this is a limitation of any empirical work. How­
ever, our results do suggest that firms should be cautious about 
expecting dramatic productivity improvements from a WSS im­
plementation. The proposition that managers need to consider 
within-worker and between-workers variability when selecting an 
operating policy such as a WSS warrants further examination. 
In summary, we found that contrary to mathematical models of 
human performance, work flow policies induce changes in indi­
vidual work rates, relative work rates (performance heterogeneity), 
and individual variability. Although the impact of work flow 
policy on individual work rates has been shown before (Doerr, 
Mitchell, Klastorin, & Brown, 1996; Schultz et al., 1998), this has 
been in regards to the impact of changes in buffers. To our 
knowledge, ours is the first study to investigate the impact of 
changes in boundary (static or dynamic) rules and the first to 
establish the impact on heterogeneity and individual variability. 
Our findings about the impact of WFP on individual differences 
in average performance and variability suggest that future research 
on flow line policies needs to consider who is on the line (average 
performance and variability), where they are on the line (line 
position effects), and the impact of WFP on the psychology and 
behavior of the group and the individual. 
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